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Case Note
CRIMINAL LAW—A Small Step Forward in Juvenile Sentencing,
But Is It Enough? The United States Supreme Court Ends
Mandatory Juvenile Life Without Parole Sentences;
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)
Brian J. Fuller*
Introduction
“Time eases all things.”1
—Sophocles
In light of its recent, more progressive rulings, the United States Supreme
Court has concluded time does ease the unfortunate immaturity of juvenile
homicide offenders, who deserve the opportunity to prove they have demonstrated
enough maturity and rehabilitation to reenter society.2 This conclusion prevailed
despite a shift in social perceptions reflecting both a more punitive stance towards
crime and an increasing desire to try juveniles as adults, especially those juveniles
committing the most serious crimes.3
The tension between punitive social perceptions and juvenile rehabilitation
collided in 2005 when the United States Supreme Court categorically outlawed
the death penalty for juveniles.4 In 2010, the Court prohibited the imposition of

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2014; B.A., Cornell College, 2007. I would
like to thank the Wyoming Law Review Editorial Board, particularly Joshua Eames, Anne Kugler,
and Christopher Sherwood, for their guidance, support, and patience during the writing process;
my family and friends for their encouragement; finally, my eternal gratitude to Kelly, my joy,
inspiration, and motivation.
Sophocles, Oedipus the King line 1579 (E. Osborne ed., J.E. Thomas trans., Prestwick
Hous. Lit. Touchstone Press 2005) (c. 429 B.C.E.).
1

See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (“Roper and Graham establish that
children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.”); Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 570–71, 578 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids imposition of the
death penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed);
see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (holding that the Constitution
prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not
commit homicide).
2

Aaron Kupchik, Prosecuting Adolescents in Adult and Juvenile Courts 1–2 (2006)
(“Slogans like ‘old enough to do the crime, old enough to do the time’ offer a new logic to compete
with the modern conception of reduced culpability for youths relative to adults by suggesting that
youth who commit severe crimes should be treated as adults rather than as juveniles.”).
3

4

See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570–71, 578.
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a life without parole sentence on juvenile offenders convicted of a non-homicide
offense.5 In Miller v. Alabama, the Court continued to distinguish juveniles from
adults for sentencing purposes by determining that imposing a mandatory life
without parole sentence for any crime was cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.6
This case note argues the Court correctly prohibited mandatory life without
parole for juveniles but erred when it failed to establish a broad, categorical rule
prohibiting all juvenile life without parole sentences.7 First, this case note provides
a background into the evolution of juvenile justice, the treatment of juveniles
in sentencing, the Court’s important decisions in Roper and Graham, and a
background of Wyoming law before Miller.8 Second, this case note discusses how
the Court correctly concluded juveniles are different from adults and may not
be mandatorily sentenced to life without parole.9 Third, this case note questions
the Court’s decision not to establish a categorical rule prohibiting all juvenile life
without parole sentences.10 Finally, this case note concludes with Miller’s potential
effect on the sentencing of juveniles in Wyoming and the unanswered questions
that remain in juvenile sentencing after Miller.11

Background
The Evolution of Juvenile Justice
At the beginning of the Twentieth Century, the United States took a
progressive view of juvenile offenders through a preference for rehabilitation
over harsh punishment.12 The dissatisfaction with a criminal court system that
detained, tried, and punished children in the same manner as adults led to the

5

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.

6

See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.

See infra notes 160–208 and accompanying text; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 570, 578;
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
7

8

See infra notes 12 –91 and accompanying text.

9

See infra notes 160–69 and accompanying text.

10

See infra notes 170–208 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes 209– 60 and accompanying text.

See Audrey Dupont, The Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and Age and the Con
stitutionality of Using Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences, 78 Denv. U. L. Rev. 255,
257 (2000). Reformers preferred a system that nurtured and protected juveniles, rather than one
that held them wholly accountable for their offenses. Id. See also Claude Noriega, Stick a Fork In It:
Is Juvenile Justice Done? 16 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 669, 676 (2000) (“Historically, the aim of the
juvenile justice system, as an entity separate from the adult criminal system, has been purportedly
rehabilitative . . . .”).
12
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creation of a separate juvenile court system in the 1890s.13 Juvenile courts provided
a rehabilitative alternative to punishment.14 The system was designed to provide
a civil, rather than a criminal, remedy.15 Accordingly, there was no sentencing,
as the court instead entered a “disposition.”16 A specialized judge followed this
rehabilitative ideal and made individual decisions that were both therapeutic and
in the child’s best interests.17 Consequently, juvenile judges regarded a child’s
crimes as a symptom of his or her “real needs,” and found the nature of the
offense irrelevant to the degree and duration of the disposition.18 Because juvenile
proceedings were non-criminal in nature, and juvenile court judges followed the
doctrine of parens patriae, many of the constitutional rights extended to adults in
criminal proceedings were denied to juveniles who committed similar offenses.19
The doctrine of parens patriae allowed the state to act in its sovereign capacity as
provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves.20
Although the historical characterization of the juvenile justice system was
rehabilitative, there has been an increasing trend to one that is punitive.21
Accordingly, juveniles have been charged as adults more frequently and face more

13
William W. Booth, History and Philosophy of the Juvenile Court, 2011 Juvl. FL-CLE 1-1
§ 1.6 (2011). Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York experimented with separate dockets for
juveniles in the late 1890s. Id. In 1899, Illinois became the first state to create a statewide system
of separate juvenile courts in 1899. Id. See also Samuel M. Davis et al., Children in the Legal
System: Cases and Materials 857–58 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., Foundation Press 3d ed. 2004).

Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems’ Responses to Youth Violence, 24 Crime
& Just. 189, 192 (1998). However, juvenile courts initially did not provide common procedural
safeguards found in adult courts, such as the rights to a jury and counsel. Id. See also Marvin
Ventrell, From Cause to Profession: The Development of Children’s Law and Practice, 32 Colo. Law.
65, 67 (2003) (describing the creation of the juvenile court system).
14

Ronald D. Spon, Juvenile Justice: A Work “In Progress”, 10 Regent U. L. Rev. 29, 33 n.13
(1998) (“The term ‘disposition’ is customarily used in juvenile court parlance in place of the word
‘sentencing’ as delinquency cases are generally technically deemed as ‘civil’ in nature, as opposed to
‘criminal.’ This is true even though ‘delinquency,’ by definition, necessarily involves a violation of a
criminal statute, law, or ordinance.”).
15

16

Id.

17

See Feld, supra note 14, at 193.

18

Id.

See Janet E. Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response to Critics of Juvenile Court
Abolition, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 927, 935 (1995) (illustrating how the juvenile court shrugged off due
process concerns as irrelevant of the court’s primary mission, which was to craft dispositions to
address the social needs of the offending youth); see also Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: A
Historical Perspective, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 1187, 1221–22 (1970).
19

20

Black’s Law Dictionary 1221 (9th ed. 2009).

See supra notes 12–19 and accompanying text; see also Kelly K. Elsea, The Juvenile Crime
Debate: Rehabilitation, Punishment, or Prevention, 5 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 135, 136 (1995)
(“Society is beginning to view children as less innocent and more capable of distinguishing right
from wrong.”).
21
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“adult-like” punishments.22 Because juvenile courts were structured without the
same procedural safeguards as adult courts, the United States Supreme Court
began providing certain protections for juveniles.23 In the 1960s and 1970s, the
Court outlined the rights juveniles must receive in juvenile criminal proceedings.24
In Kent v. United States, the Court held juvenile proceedings must, at a minimum,
comport with the standards of due process and fairness.25 One year later, the Court
held in In re Gault that juveniles possessed the right to a notice of charges, counsel,
confrontation of witnesses, and protection against self-incrimination.26 Finally,
the Court decided in In re Winship that the Government must prove all charges
against juveniles beyond a reasonable doubt.27 These procedural protections have
shifted juvenile courts toward an adjudicatory process more similar to the adult
criminal system.28
While juvenile justice has shifted towards a more punitive model similar to
adult court, more juveniles are being transferred from juvenile to adult court.29
The most common strategy to transfer a juvenile to adult court is by waiver.30
State legislatures have passed one of three types of waivers. First, a judicial waiver
allows a juvenile court judge to waive jurisdiction on a discretionary basis after
conducting a hearing to determine whether a youth is amenable to treatment or

22

See Kupchik, supra note 3, at 1–2.

See infra notes 24–28 and accompanying text; see also Sarah M. Cotton, Comment, When
the Punishment Cannot Fit the Crime: The Case for Reforming the Juvenile Justice System, 52 Ark. L.
Rev. 563, 567–69 (1994) (describing how the Supreme Court required juvenile courts to follow
certain procedural requirements when adjudicating juvenile offenders’ cases).
23

See infra notes 25–27 and accompanying text (describing procedural safeguards now
required for juveniles whose cases are adjudicated in juvenile courts).
24

25

Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).

26

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 32–57 (1967).

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). In re Winship also mandated that juveniles
were entitled to criminal due process safeguards. Id. at 365–66. However, juveniles in juvenile
proceedings are not afforded all the rights afforded to criminal defendants in adult courts. See, e.g.,
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (“[W]e conclude that trial by jury in the
juvenile court’s adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement.”).
27

James E. McDougall, Crisis in the Juvenile Justice System, Arizona Attorney, Oct. 29,
1992, at 23 (“The process of juvenile justice today is more formalized, [and] the discretion of the
Juvenile Judges is more restricted . . . .”).
28

See Cynthia Conward, The Juvenile Justice System: Not Necessarily in the Best Interests of
Children, 33 New Eng. L. Rev. 39, 52 (1998) (“Today, all states allow juveniles to be tried as
adults in criminal court under certain circumstances.”); Feld, supra note 14, at 195; Randie P.
Ullman, Note, Federal Juvenile Waiver Practices: A Contextual Approach to the Consideration of Prior
Delinquency Records, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1329, 1346 (2000).
29

See Feld, supra note 14, at 196; Lisa M. Flesch, Note, Juvenile Crime and Why Waiver Is Not
the Answer, 42 Fam. Ct. Rev. 583, 586 (2004) (“Every state has its own transfer statute that allows
for the transfer of juveniles to adult court in one of three ways: legislative waiver, prosecutorial
waiver, or judicial waiver.”).
30
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is a threat to the public.31 Second, an offense exclusion waiver excludes youth
accused of certain crimes from juvenile court.32 Third, some states have given
prosecutors discretion to decide whether a juvenile charged with a particular
crime should be tried in juvenile or adult court.33 Once a juvenile is transferred
and tried in adult court he or she is afforded the due process an adult would
expect to receive during both trial and sentencing.34 Additionally, juveniles treated
as adults would be treated similarly for sentencing and punishment.35 Later, in
some states a parole board will consider various factors to determine whether
a juvenile offender should be allowed to re-enter society.36 Many states provide
statutory factors, including a consideration of the offender’s personality and his
or her maturity.37
Wyoming allows juveniles to be transferred to adult court through a judicial
waiver.38 The juvenile court is authorized to hold a transfer hearing and may
transfer a juvenile to adult court after considering a number of factors.39 These

31
See Jennifer Park, Note, Balancing Rehabilitation and Punishment: A Legislative Solution for
Unconstitutional Judicial Waiver Policies, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 786, 799–800 (2008) (describing
the various formulations of judicial waiver, including full judicial discretion, presumptions for
transferring the juvenile to adult court, and automatic waiver to adult court if certain conditions—
such as age or the offense—are met).
32
See Feld, supra note 14, at 196. For example, a number of states excludes youth sixteen and
older and charged with murder from juvenile court. Id.; see also Conward, supra note 29, at 152
(describing the mechanisms by which juveniles may be tried in adult court).
33

See Feld, supra note 14, at 197.

See Catherine R. Guttman, Note, Listen to the Children: The Decision to Transfer Juveniles to
Adult Court, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 507, 529 (1995); Shannon F. McLatchey, Note, Juvenile
Crime and Punishment: An Analysis of the “Get Tough” Approach, 10 U. Fla. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 401,
406 (1999) (discussing how some critics advocate for juveniles to be tried in adult court in order to
receive full due process protections).
34

35
See Douglas A. Hager, Does the Texas Juvenile Waiver Statute Comport with the Requirements of Due Process?, 26 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 813, 830 (1995); Jarod K. Hofacket, Comment, How
Young is Too Young for a Child to be Tried and Punished as an Adult?, 34 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 159,
171–72 (2002).

See Scott R. Hechinger, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Antidote to Congress’s One-Way
Criminal Ratchet? 35 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 408, 452 (2011) (“An opportunity for parole
is just that: a chance for a prisoner to show strong evidence of rehabilitation. If a juvenile offender
does not demonstrate change and is deemed a threat to public safety, the parole board will not grant
parole.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
36

See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1979)
(outlining the statutory factors Nebraska parole boards must consider when determining whether
to release an inmate); N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i (McKinney 2012) (listing factors parole boards must
consider before granting discretionary release on parole); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17-22.5-404
(2011) (same); Mich. Admin. Code. r. 791.7715 (2012) (same).
37

38
See infra notes 39–40 and accompanying text (describing the judicial waiver process
in Wyoming).
39

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-237 (2004).
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factors take into account the seriousness and nature of the offense, the juvenile’s
personal background and previous history in the legal system, the prospects for
protecting the public and rehabilitating the juvenile, and the potential efficiency
of adjudicating the case in juvenile or adult court.40

The Eighth Amendment and Proportionality in Sentencing
The Eighth Amendment states “cruel and unusual punishments [shall not
be] inflicted.”41 Today, before determining whether a punishment is cruel and
unusual, courts are required to look beyond historical conceptions to “the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”42 Punishments
have been challenged under the Eighth Amendment in two primary ways.43 First,
the Eighth Amendment prohibits inherently barbaric punishments, including the
imposition of torture under all circumstances.44 The essential principle is that,
“under the Eighth Amendment, the State must respect the human attributes of
even those who have committed the most serious crimes.”45
Second, when determining whether a sentence is cruel and unusual, courts
must consider the proportionality of the sentence to the crime committed.46 For
example, a sentence of twenty-five years to life for a third shoplifting offense
was considered grossly disproportionate and thus unconstitutional.47 The
concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment, because grossly
disproportionate sentences are inherently cruel and unusual.48 The Court’s
decisions concerning the proportionality of sentences fall within two general
classifications.49 The first classification includes challenges to the particular length

Id. The factors include, in part: the seriousness of the alleged offense; whether the offense
was committed in a violent and/or aggressive manner; the sophistication and maturity of the juvenile
as determined by considering his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern
of living; the record and previous criminal history of the juvenile; and the prospects of adequate
protection of the public and the likelihood of rehabilitation of the juvenile. Id.
40

41
U.S. Const. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). Initially, this amendment was adopted to prohibit
certain methods of punishment thought to be cruel and unusual. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957, 979 (1991) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion); see, e.g., Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 560–61 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002).
42

See infra notes 44–54 and accompanying text (describing Eighth Amendment challenges
to sentences).
43

44

See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879).

45

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010).

46

Id.

47

See Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 775 (9th Cir. 2004).

48

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021.

49

See infra notes 50, 52 and accompanying text.
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of term-of-years sentences given the circumstances in a particular case.50 Appellate
courts often struggle when considering challenges to term-of-years sentences
because the United States Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence involving
non-capital crimes has “not established a clear or consistent path for courts to
follow in applying the highly deferential narrow proportionality analysis.”51 In
the second classification of decisions, the Court established categorical rules that
definitively shaped and defined Eighth Amendment standards.52 Categorical rules
were first established in response to the death penalty.53 For example, the Court
has held that imposing the death penalty for non-homicide crimes, or imposing it
on the mentally handicapped, violates the Eighth Amendment.54

Categorical Prohibitions on Juvenile Sentencing: Roper v. Simmons and
Graham v. Florida
Before Roper and Graham, the Court struggled with imposing limits on
juvenile sentencing.55 In 1988, the Court prohibited the execution of juveniles
who committed serious crimes before the age of sixteen.56 Only one year later,
however, and in accord with the trend of punitive sentences over rehabilitation,
the Court held imposing capital punishment on a juvenile who committed a
capital crime at sixteen or seventeen years of age did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.57
In 2005, in Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court reversed its position on
capital punishment for juveniles, holding the imposition of the death penalty
on individuals under the age of eighteen at the time of their crime was cruel and

50

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021.

See United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1336 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Graham,
130 S. Ct. at 2036–37 (Roberts, C.J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted); John
D. Castiglione, Qualitative and Quantitative Proportionality: A Specific Critique of Retributivism,
71 Ohio St. L.J. 71, 75 (2010) (“It has become conventional wisdom that Eighth Amendment
proportionality jurisprudence is a mess.”).
51

52

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022–23).

See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446– 47 (2008) (holding that imposing the death
penalty on individuals convicted of non-homicide crimes was unconstitutional); see also Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that imposing the death penalty on “mentally
retarded” criminals was unconstitutional).
53

54

See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 446–47; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.

See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a person who was under sixteen at the time of his
or her offense). But see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (affirming constitutionality
of death sentence for juvenile sixteen or older at time of offense), overruled by Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 574, 578 (2005).
55

56

See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.

57

See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380, overruled by Roper, 543 U.S. at 574, 578.
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unusual under the Eighth Amendment.58 In Roper, the defendant was seventeen
when he kidnapped a woman, bound her, and threw her off a bridge where she
drowned.59 The defendant was charged with first-degree murder, convicted, and
sentenced to death.60 On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding
the execution of individuals under eighteen at the time of their offenses was
prohibited under the Eighth Amendment.61
The United States Supreme Court affirmed.62 Justice Kennedy, writing for
the majority, established a categorical rule prohibiting the imposition of capital
punishment on juveniles.63 In its Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis,
the majority considered “the evolving standards of decency that mark progress
of a maturing society.”64 To determine whether the “evolving standards” justify a
particular sentence, the Court first reviews the objective indicia of consensus, as
expressed by state legislatures’ enactments that address the particular sentencing
question.65 Then, the Court considers in the exercise of its own independent
judgment whether a particular sentence is a disproportionate punishment.66 The
Court first examined objective indicia of consensus by considering the enactments
of legislatures that addressed the question.67 When considering objective indicia,
the Court found sufficient evidence of a national consensus rejecting the death
penalty for juveniles because a majority of states rejected its use, there was a
consistent trend toward continued abolition of the death penalty for juveniles,
and for the states retaining it, the penalty was used infrequently.68
The Court then considered its own independent judgment to determine
whether the death penalty for juveniles violated the Constitution.69 The majority
58

Roper, 543 U.S. at 574, 578.

59

Id. at 556–57.

60

Id. at 558.

61

Id. at 559–60.

62

Id. at 578.

63

Id. at 572–74.

Id. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
64

65

Id. at 564.

66

Id.

67

Id.

Id. at 572. Thirty states prohibited the juvenile death penalty. Id. at 564. In the remaining
twenty states, only six executed prisoners for crimes committed as juveniles after the Court’s
decision in Stanford. Id. at 564–65. The Court also determined that the direction of change,
both domestically and internationally, towards abolishing the juvenile death penalty was sufficient
evidence of consensus. Id. at 565–66, 575–78.
68

69
Id. at 564. Because “consensus is not dispositive,” independent judgment is guided by
“the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court’s own understanding and
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose.” Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008).
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noted the Eighth Amendment should be applied with “special force” because
“the death penalty is the most severe punishment.”70 The Court then relied on
scientific and sociological studies to announce three general differences between
juveniles and adults: the juvenile’s sense of responsibility, vulnerability to negative
influences and outside pressures, and the formation of character.71 Through these
differences, the Court concluded juvenile offenders cannot be classified reliably
among the worst offenders, and that juveniles’ conduct was not as morally
reprehensible as adults’ conduct.72 In addition, the Court decided that a caseby-case approach would subject juveniles to an unacceptable risk of receiving the
harshest sentences with a level of culpability insufficient for the punishment.73
The Court revisited juvenile sentencing in Graham v. Florida.74 There,
Graham was sentenced to life without parole for his involvement in an armed
burglary where a clerk suffered head injuries from another individual involved in
the burglary.75 Justice Kennedy, again writing for the majority, held the Eighth
Amendment prohibited the imposition of a juvenile life without parole sentence
on a juvenile who did not commit homicide.76 In addtion, the state must give a
juvenile non-homicide offender a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based
on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”77
The Court established a categorical rule, realizing the risk that the judge’s
discretionary, subjective judgment may be used to impose a sentence despite a lack
of culpability.78 Furthermore, a case-by-case approach would fail to distinguish
between the intransient juvenile offender and the juvenile offender who has the

70

Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.

See infra notes 129–31 and accompanying text (describing the reasons why children are
constitutionally different from adults for the purposes of sentencing).
71

72

Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.

Id. at 572–73. Justice O’Connor, in dissent, wrote that the objective evidence of
contemporary societal values and the Court’s moral proportionality analysis failed to justify
the ruling. Id. at 587 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice O’Connor believed that a
categorical rule was not proper because some juveniles could act with sufficient moral culpability
when committing murders that were “premeditated, wanton, and cruel in the extreme.” See id.
at 600. Justice Scalia wrote a dissent where he criticized both the Court’s finding of a national
consensus on the “flimsiest of grounds” and the Court’s view of itself as the alleged “sole arbiter of
our Nation’s moral standards” in exercising its own independent moral judgment. Id. at 608 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
73

74

See infra notes 75–82 and accompanying text.

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018–20 (2010). Graham initially received a different
sentence, but a judge imposed the life without parole sentence after Graham violated probation. Id.
75

76

Id. at 2034.

77

Id. at 2030 (emphasis added).

78

Id. at 2031.
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requisite psychological maturity and acts with gross depravity.79 Rather, the Court
found a national consensus against the imposition of juvenile life without parole
sentences despite thirty-nine jurisdictions permitting sentences of life without
parole for a juvenile non-homicide offender.80 The Court found additional
support in actual sentencing practices, where only 123 juvenile offenders (seventyseven from Florida) were serving life without parole sentences nationwide.81 The
majority exercised its own independent judgment and relied on the three general
differences between juveniles and adults that were utilized in Roper.82 Although the
Court established a categorical rule, it did not determine whether a very lengthy
fixed term-of-years sentence with no possibility of parole imposed on a juvenile
non-homicide offender is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.83
Ultimately, these opinions have signaled a shift towards the old prevailing values
of juvenile justice: rehabilitation and individualized consideration.84

Wyoming Juvenile Sentencing Law after Roper and Graham
Wyoming law allows juvenile homicide offenders to be sentenced to life
imprisonment, although there is discretion whether the offender may receive the
opportunity for parole.85 Wyoming’s first-degree murder statute states:
(b) A person convicted of murder in the first degree shall be
punished by death, life imprisonment without parole or life
imprisonment according to law, except that no person shall be

79

Id. at 2031–32.

80

Id. at 2023–26.

81

Id. at 2024.

Id. at 2026; see supra note 71 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens concurred with the
majority opinion but emphasized that “[p]unishments that did not seem cruel and unusual at one
time may, in the light of reason and experience, be found cruel and unusual at a later time . . . .”
Id. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Chief Justice also concurred but disagreed with the
Court’s new categorical rule. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Justice Thomas, dissenting, criticized
the Court’s use of “objective indicia of consensus,” and noted the problems that the categorical rule
would bring without clear standards. Id. at 2043, 2048–49, 2057–58 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Alito noted that nothing would prevent a court from imposing a lengthy term-of-years
sentence—effectively a life sentence. Id. at 2058–59 (Alito, J., dissenting).
82

See Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 552–53 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that an eighty-nineyear sentence imposed on a juvenile with no possibility of parole was constitutionally permissible
under Graham).
83

84
See Martin Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile’s Right to Age-Appropriate
Sentencing, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 457, 500 (2012) (discussing how, after Graham, progressives
who launched the juvenile court system more than a century ago to focus on rehabilitation may now
be vindicated); supra notes 14, 17 and accompanying text.
85

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(b) (2007).
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subject to the penalty of death for any murder committed before
the defendant attained the age of eighteen (18) years.86
A Wyoming juvenile, Wyatt Bear Cloud, recently argued his sentence of “life
according to law” was unconstitutional under Graham because the sentencing
judge was statutorily required to sentence Bear Cloud to nothing less than life.87
The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the sentence
because there was an option between life with or without parole, and Bear Cloud
was afforded the possibility of parole.88 Bear Cloud also argued his sentence was
unconstitutional because it was disproportionate, but the court declined to accept
this argument since Bear Cloud was not sentenced to the most severe sentence
available.89 The court rejected Bear Cloud’s argument that the sentencing court
failed to consider any mitigating circumstances at sentencing because those
circumstances were considered, albeit only during Bear Cloud’s motion to be tried
as a juvenile.90 The Wyoming Supreme Court stated that once a juvenile’s case
was transferred to adult criminal court, the public policies affording a juvenile
different treatment than adults were no longer applicable.91

Principal Case
Background Facts
In 2003, Evan Miller, age fourteen, and a friend were at home when a
neighbor, Cole Cannon, arrived to make a drug deal with Miller’s mother.92 The
two boys returned with Cannon to his trailer, where the three smoked marijuana
and played drinking games.93 After Cannon passed out, Miller stole Cannon’s
wallet and split approximately $300 with the other boy.94 When Miller tried to

Id. (emphasis added). “Life imprisonment according to law” is a life sentence that provides
the possibility of parole only after the governor has commuted the person’s sentence to a term of
years. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c) (2010); Weldon v. State, 800 P.2d 513, 514 (Wyo. 1990).
86

87
See Bear Cloud v. State, 275 P.3d 377, 411–13 (Wyo. 2012), vacated, 81 U.S.L.W. 3159
(Oct. 1, 2012) The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in Bear
Cloud for further consideration in light of Miller. See Bear Cloud v. Wyoming, 81 U.S.L.W. 3159
(Oct. 1, 2012).
88

Bear Cloud, 275 P.3d at 411–13.

89

Id. at 406.

See id. at 412; see also infra notes 139–42 and accompanying text (describing the Miller
Court’s rejection of the argument that the defendants’ sentences were discretionary because of the
individualized discretion that took place at the transfer hearing).
90

91

Bear Cloud, 275 P.3d at 411–13.

92

See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2462 (2012).

93

Id.

94

Id.
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place the wallet back in Cannon’s pocket, Cannon awoke and grabbed Miller by
the throat.95 The other boy smashed Cannon with a baseball bat.96 When Miller
broke free, he grabbed the baseball bat and repeatedly struck Cannon.97 The boys
left and later decided to conceal evidence of their attack.98 Upon returning to
Cannon’s trailer, they burnt it to the ground.99 Cannon ultimately died from
his injuries and smoke inhalation.100 Prosecutors charged Miller with murder in
the course of arson, which carried a mandatory life without parole sentence.101
A jury found Miller guilty and the court mandatorily sentenced him to life
without parole.102
Alabama’s mandatory sentence precluded the court from considering
pertinent information about Miller’s personal and family background.103 Miller’s
childhood was certainly difficult.104 Miller bounced in and out of foster care
because his mother suffered from drug and alcohol addiction and his stepfather
abused him.105 Miller himself regularly used drugs and alcohol.106 He attempted
suicide four times, the first attempt taking place when Miller was six.107
Ultimately, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Miller’s sentence,
ruling that the mandatory sentence was not overly harsh and did not violate the
Eighth Amendment.108
Miller v. Alabama was combined with another case, Jackson v. Hobbs.109 In
Jackson, Kuntrell Jackson, like Miller, was fourteen years old when he and two
other boys robbed a video store.110 En route to the store, Jackson learned that one
of the boys was carrying a sawed-off shotgun.111 Jackson decided to stay outside
95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Id.

100

Id.

Id. at 2462–63. Alabama law required that Miller initially be charged as a juvenile but
allowed the District Attorney to seek removal of the case to adult court. Id. at 2462.
101

102

Id. at 2463.

103

See infra notes 104–07 and accompanying text.

104

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462.

105

Id.

106

Id.

107

Id.

108

Id. at 2463.

Id. at 2460. The cases were combined when the Court granted certiorari in both cases in
November 2011. See id.
109

110

Id. at 2461.

111

Id.
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while the other two robbed the store, but later went inside.112 The boy with the
shotgun shot and killed the store clerk when she threatened to call the police.113
The state charged and the jury convicted Jackson of capital felony murder
and aggravated robbery.114 Like Alabama, Arkansas law mandated a defendant
convicted of capital murder to be sentenced to either death or life without
parole.115 The judge sentenced Jackson to life without parole and noted that “in
view of the verdict, there’s only one possible sentence.”116
Jackson also had a troubled childhood.117 Jackson grew up impoverished and
lived in public housing projects rampant with drugs and violence.118 Jackson’s
father left him at an early age and his mother’s boyfriend was an abusive
alcoholic.119 His mother was sent to prison for shooting a neighbor when Jackson
was six.120 Arkansas’s mandatory sentencing scheme also precluded the court from
considering any of Jackson’s personal and family background.121

Majority Opinion
Justice Kagan, writing for a five-to-four majority, held the Eighth Amendment
forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of
parole for juvenile offenders.122 The Court reasoned that by making youth irrelevant
to the imposition of life without parole, a mandatory juvenile sentencing scheme
poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.123 Following Roper and
Graham, the Court engaged in its Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis
by examining the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”124 The Court considered the “evolving standards of decency”

112
Id. The parties disputed whether Jackson warned the clerk or made a comment to his
friends questioning their actions. Id.
113

Id.

114

Id.

115

Id. (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-104(b) (1997)).

116

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

117

See infra notes 118–20 and accompanying text.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No.
10-9647), 2011 WL 5322575, at *4.
118

119

Id. at *4–5.

Id. at *5. Jackson previously was detained on other charges and was held at a juvenile
detention facility in Arkansas. Jackson v. State, 194 S.W.3d 757, 759 (Ark. 2004). Jackson’s other
crimes were not explicitly stated. See id.
120

121

See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.

122

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).

123

Id.

Id. at 2463 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
124
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by considering its own independent judgment and objective indicia of societal
consensus by examining the enactments of state legislatures pertaining to life
without parole sentences.125 First, the Court considered its independent judgment
to determine the proportionality of juvenile life without parole sentences.126 The
Court considered two strands of its precedent: the categorical bans adopted in Roper
and Graham and previous prohibitions on the mandatory imposition of capital
punishment.127 The Court again relied on the sociological differences between
juveniles and adults.128 First, children lack maturity and have an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility.129 Second, children are more vulnerable to negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.130 Third, a child’s
character is not well-formed like an adult’s and his or her actions are less likely to
be evidence of irretrievable depravity.131 The Court applied those differences when
considering life without parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders because
children’s distinctive mental traits are not crime-specific.132 Ultimately, the Court
believed Graham’s reasoning applies to any juvenile life without parole sentence,
especially considering the risk of imposing a disproportionate punishment on a
juvenile with diminished culpability.133
Second, the Court considered the objective indicia of society’s standards.134
Twenty-nine states mandated life without parole for juvenile homicide
offenders.135 However, the Court found this evidence to be weaker support of
a national consensus against prohibition of such sentences.136 In Graham, the

125
See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text (describing the two steps the Court takes
when considering the “evolving standards of decency” to determine whether a particular sentence is
disproportionate and thus unconstitutional).
126

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463–69.

127

Id. at 2463–64, 2467.

128

See infra notes 129–31 and accompanying text.

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005))
(“[C]hildren have a ‘lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ leading to
recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.”).
129

130
Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569) (“[C]hildren are more vulnerable . . . to negative
influences and outside pressures, including from their family and peers; they have limited contro[l]
over their own environment, and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crimeproducing settings.” (internal quotation marks omited)).

Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570) (“[A] child’s character is not as ‘well-formed’
as an adult’s; his traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be ‘evidence of irretrievabl[e]
deprav[ity].’”).
131

132

Id. at 2465, 2469.

Id. at 2469 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 573; Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011,
2026–27 (2011)).
133

134

Id. at 2470–72.

135

Id. at 2471.

136

Id. at 2471–72.
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Court prohibited life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders even
though thirty-nine states permitted that sentence.137 The Court reasoned Miller
was similar to Graham and Roper and was not breaking any new ground in what
constitutes objective indicia of society’s standards.138
The majority rejected the states’ argument that Miller’s and Jackson’s sentences
were indeed discretionary because individualized factors were considered when
deciding whether to transfer Miller and Jackson to adult court.139 The Court
determined this discretion at the early transfer hearing had limited utility
because a judge would have only partial information.140 The Court noted that
the consideration of mitigating circumstances at a transfer hearing may differ
dramatically from the issue at a post-trial sentencing, where the judge would
have different, and discretionary, sentencing options.141 Ultimately, the discretion
available to a judge at a transfer hearing cannot substitute for the discretion at
sentencing without violating the Eighth Amendment.142
In Miller, the Court did not establish a categorical rule as it did in Roper and
Graham.143 Rather, the Court held the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing
scheme that mandates life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders.144 The
Court further held the mitigating factors of youth must be considered, and the
differences between adults and children counsel against irrevocably sentencing
them to life without parole.145 The Court stated that appropriate occasions for
sentencing juveniles to life without parole would be uncommon due to the
difficulty of distinguishing the intransient juvenile offender with the irreparably
corrupted juvenile offender.146 Ultimately, the Court stated that a judge must take
into account how children are different and how those differences counsel against
imposing a life without parole sentence.147

137

Id.

138

Id. at 2472.

139

Id. at 2469–70.

140

Id. at 2474.

141

Id.

142

Id. at 2475.

143

Id. at 2469.

144

Id.

145

Id. at 2467, 2469.

Id. at 2469. Justice Breyer wrote separately, noting that if Jackson did not kill or intend to
kill the store clerk, his culpability would be “twice-diminished” and Graham would preclude a life
without parole sentence. Id. at 2475–77 (Breyer, J., concurring).
146

147

Id. at 2469 (majority opinion).
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Dissenting Opinions
Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito.148 The dissent disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of the objective
indicia of society’s standards, especially since the number of mandatory juvenile
life without parole sentences was over 5,000 times higher than the corresponding
statistic in Graham.149 The dissent also attacked the statement that juvenile life
without parole sentences would be “uncommon,” expressing concern that the
Court may have “bootstrapped its way to declaring that the Eighth Amendment
absolutely prohibits them.”150 The Chief Justice believed the majority’s analysis
would lead to prohibiting the prosecution of juveniles in adult courts.151 Justices
Thomas and Alito shared similar concerns, writing that the Court may soon
prohibit life without parole sentences for juveniles who commit murder.152

Analysis
In Miller, the Court correctly prohibited the mandatory imposition of life
without parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders.153 The Court, however,
should have engaged fully in the Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis
and adopted a categorical rule prohibiting life without parole sentences for all
juveniles.154 A categorical rule would still give sentencing judges ample discretion
to impose a severe punishment that fulfills the penological goals of retribution,
deterrence, and incapacitation while properly focusing on the juvenile offender’s

148
Id. at 2477 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Justice Alito wrote separately for reasons similar
to the Chief Justice’s. Id. at 2487–90 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas wrote to express his
continuing dissatisfaction with the Court’s proportionality analysis and his belief that the Court has
“gone from ‘merely’ divining the societal consensus of today to shaping the societal consensus of
tomorrow.” Id. at 2482–86 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
149
Id. at 2478–79 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). In Graham, the Court stated that 123 prisoners
were serving life without parole for non-homicide offenses committed as juveniles while, in 2007,
nearly 400,000 juveniles were arrested for serious non-homicide crimes. Id. However, approximately
2000 individuals were serving life without parole for homicides committed as juveniles, and 1170
juveniles were arrested for murder in 2009 alone. Charles Puzzanchera & Benjamin Adams, Dep’t
of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Arrests 2009
(2011), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/236477.pdf.
150

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2478, 2481.

151

Id. at 2481.

See id. at 2486 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2490 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito
believed that future cases would “extrapolate from [Miller’s] holding and continue until the majority
establishes sentencing practices that line up with what the majority views as truly evolved standards
of decency.” Id.
152

153
See id. at 2469 (majority opinion) (discussing the Court’s holding forbidding the mandatory
imposition of juvenile life without parole sentences).

See infra notes 173–208 and accompanying text (describing the merits of a categorical rule
and how the Court could have engaged in proportionality analysis to reach this result).
154
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rehabilitation and taking youth into account as a mitigating factor.155 Finally,
Wyoming must alter its sentencing scheme to require consideration of mitigating
factors at sentencing.156 The State could best comply with Miller in one of two
ways.157 First, the state can require judges to consider mitigating factors at the
sentencing hearing.158 Second, the state can simply eliminate life without parole
for juveniles.159

Juvenile Life Without Parole Sentences: From Mandatory to Advisory
with No Advice
The Court correctly held the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing
schemes that mandatorily impose life without parole sentences on juveniles.160 In
Miller, the Court held a sentencing judge should look at facts such as the offender’s
youthful age and diminished culpability, his family and personal background,
and his role and actions in the commission of the crime in question.161 The
Court correctly followed Roper and Graham and determined that a mandatory
sentencing scheme was flawed.162 The mandatory scheme gave no significance
to the character and record of the offender and excluded from consideration the
possibility of compassionate or mitigating circumstances.163 The Court properly
followed previous rulings, insisting that sentencing judges and juries consider the
mitigating circumstances of youth.164
In addition, the Court’s conclusion is supported by United States v. Booker
and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).165 Since 2005, the Court has retreated from mandatory

155

See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028–30 (2010).

See infra notes 210–31 and accompanying text (describing options available to Wyoming
to amend its statutory sentencing scheme to better reflect Miller’s mandate).
156

157
See infra notes 212–30 and accompanying text (describing two possibilities to amend
Wyoming’s sentencing statute to better reflect requirements for juvenile sentencing when life
without parole is implicated).
158

See infra notes 212–17 and accompanying text.

159

See infra notes 224–30 and accompanying text.

160

See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).

161

Id. at 2467, 2469.

162

See id. at 2468 (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010)).

163

Id.

See id. at 2467, 2469; see also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) (a sentencer must
have the ability to consider the “mitigating qualities of youth”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 115 (1982) (“[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact.”).
164

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258–65 (2005).
In Booker, the Court held that, because the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth
Amendment’s right to a jury trial, the Guidelines could no longer be mandatory but continue to be
advisory. Id. Under these advisory guidelines, a federal district judge must consider the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the
165
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sentencing schemes in favor of individualized sentencing.166 Because juvenile
offenders have diminished culpability, they are significantly different from
adults.167 This difference militates against a sentence that “forswears altogether
the rehabilitative ideal.”168 The majority in Miller noted the differences between
juvenile and adult offenders counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to life
in prison.169
However, the Court should have established a broad, categorical ban on
juvenile life without parole sentences.170 Although courts are now required to
consider youth as a mitigating factor, the Court provided no guidance for lower
courts when sentencing a juvenile homicide offender.171 The Court’s failure to
provide further guidance will leave both state legislatures and courts in uncertainty
as they attempt to comply with Miller.172

Establishing a Categorical Rule from Miller
Similar to Roper and Graham, the Court in Miller had the opportunity to
establish another broad categorical rule forbidding the imposition of juvenile life
without parole.173 The Court instead concluded that prohibiting the mandatory
aspect of the sentence was sufficient to cure the constitutional infirmity.174
Here, the Court should have engaged in the similar analysis that it undertook

sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the sentence, to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct, to protect the public from the defendant’s further crimes, and to provide the defendant
with rehabilitative opportunities; and the kinds of sentences available. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
166

See supra note 165 and accompanying text; see also Guggenheim, supra note 84, at 491.

167

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028–30.

See id. at 2030; see also Sara Taylor, Comment, Unlocking the Gates of Desolation Row,
59 UCLA L. Rev. 1810, 1862 (2012) (arguing that an individualized assessment is “necessary to
differentiate accurately between those for whom a harsh sentence is appropriate and those for whom
such a sentence is grossly disproportionate and thus unconstitutional.”).
168

169

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467–69.

See infra notes 173–208 and accompanying text (describing the reasons for establishing a
categorical ban prohibiting all juvenile life without parole sentences).
170

171

See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.

See infra notes 239–60 and accompanying text (describing, for example, Wyoming’s
challenges in determining how to sentence juveniles who might be convicted of first-degree murder
and in determining the disposition of those juveniles already sentenced to life without parole).
172

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570, 578 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
forbids imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when
their crimes were committed); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (holding that the
Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who
did not commit homicide).
173

174

See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
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in Roper and Graham, considering the “evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.”175 If the Court had engaged in its Eighth
Amendment proportionality analysis, it would have relied on the objective indicia
of societal consensus and its own independent moral judgment to establish a
categorical ban on the imposition of juvenile life without parole sentences.176
This clear line is necessary to prevent the possibility that life without parole
sentences will be imposed on juvenile offenders who are not sufficiently culpable
because such a sentence would be cruel and unusual, thereby violating the
Eighth Amendment.177
The evidence of objective indicia may not be as strong as it was in Graham,
but it still lends strong support toward the adoption of a categorical prohibition.178
Before Miller, twenty-nine states made life without parole mandatory for juveniles
convicted of murder in adult court.179 Of these twenty-nine states, more than
half disregard the age of the offender.180 In Graham, the Court established a
categorical rule despite the fact thirty-nine jurisdictions permitted life without
parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders.181 In Miller, the Court noted that
ten fewer jurisdictions permitted life without parole for homicide offenders than
the corresponding statistic in Graham.182 The majority correctly referred to Roper

See supra notes 62–82 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s use of objective
indicia and its own independent moral judgment to establish categorical prohibitions in Roper
and Graham).
175

176
See infra notes 178–81 and accompanying text. See generally Corinna Lain, Lessons Learned
from the Evolution of “Evolving Standards”, 4 Charleston L. Rev. 661, 674 (2010) (“The cases
[Roper and Graham] that paved the road to evolving standards as a substantive doctrine show the
Justices time and again rejecting the result that a cold reading of the law would provide in favor of
what they thought was right.”).
177

See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).

See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–74 (describing the Court’s judgment of the differences
between children and adults and the Court’s treatment of evidence of objective indicia of society’s standards).
178

179
Id. at 2471. See, e.g., Ala. Code §13A-5-45 (2005 & Cum. Supp. 2011); Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 13-751 (2010); Ark. Code. Ann. § 5-4-104 (2011); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-35a (2011);
Del. Code. Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(a) (2007); Fla. Stat. § 775.082(1) (2010); Iowa Code § 902.1
(2011); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2522 (2008); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-6-1 (2005); Wash. Rev.
Code §§ 10.95.020, 10.95.030 (2003); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101 (2010).
180
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2473. See, e.g., Ala. Code §§ 13A–5–45(f ), 13A-6-2(c) (2005 &
Cum. Supp. 2011); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-752 (2010), § 41-1604.09(I) (2011); Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 53a-35a(1) (2011); Del. Code Ann., tit. 11, § 4209(a) (2007); Fla. Stat. § 775.082(1)
(2011); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706-656(1) (1993); Idaho Code Ann. § 18–4004 (2004); Mich.
Comp. Laws § 791.234(6)(a) (2012); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.106, subd. 2 (2009); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 29–2522 (2008); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:1–a (2007); S.D. Codified Laws § 22–6–1(1)
(2006); S.D. Codified Laws § 24–15–4 (2004); Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 13, § 2311(c) (2009); Wash.
Rev. Code § 10.95.030(1) (2010).
181

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.

182

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 n.10.
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and Graham when it stated that this objective evidence was not distinguishable
from previous cases holding that a sentencing practice violates the Eighth
Amendment.183 There are also indications that imposing a life without parole
sentence for a juvenile murderer is not a particularly widespread practice.184 In
the last thirty years, juveniles were involved in 27,371 murders.185 However, only
2500 were sentenced to serve life without parole in prison.186 Approximately three
percent of individuals serving life without parole were juveniles at the time of
their offenses.187
Furthermore, the Court had strong support from precedent and scientific
and sociological studies to exercise its own independent judgment to establish
a broad categorical rule.188 The Court in Roper and Graham spent significant
time outlining the distinctions between juveniles and adults that gave rise to
the conclusion that children are constitutionally different from adults for the
purposes of sentencing.189 The Miller Court correctly pointed out that juveniles
have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, making them less
deserving of the most severe punishment.190 After considering the mitigating
characteristics of youth, however, lower courts may still impose a life without
parole sentence on a juvenile.191 Courts can still guarantee that a juvenile
homicide offender will die in prison, regardless of what the offender might do to
demonstrate rehabilitation and maturity.192
In Graham, the Court held the Eighth Amendment required that a juvenile
non-homicide offender have a meaningful opportunity to rejoin society.193 Just as
in Roper and Graham, the Court in Miller noted the difficulties of distinguishing

183

See id. at 2470–72.

184

See infra notes 185–86 and accompanying text.

Dep’t of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Estimated
Number of Homicide Victims of Known Juvenile Offenders, 1980-2010, Statistical Briefing
Book (July 31, 2012), available at http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/offenders/qa03105.asp. The statistics
used in this note do not include those murders where both juveniles and adults were involved. Over
the past thirty years, 12,118 homicides occurred where both juveniles and adults were involved. Id.
185

186

See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2477 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

Adam Liptak, To More Inmates, Life Term Means Dying Behind Bars, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2,
2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/02/national/02life.html.
187

188

See infra notes 189–96 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 62–82 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s use of objective
indicia and its own independent moral judgment to establish categorical prohibitions in Roper and
Graham); see also Guggenheim, supra note 84, at 462.
189

190

See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text.

191

See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text.

192

See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010).

193

Id. at 2030, 2033.
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“the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”194 In
doing so, the Miller Court ignored the similar constitutional question—whether
a juvenile homicide offender must receive a meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.195 To correct the
constitutional infirmity, the Court in Miller should have extended its holding
in Graham to all juvenile offenders by requiring all courts to provide “some
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity
and rehabilitation.”196
Contrary to the dissenters’ concern, a categorical rule would not lead the
Court down a path with “no discernible end point.”197 The Court correctly noted
the similarities that life without parole sentences share with death sentences,
particularly the fact that life without parole is also an irrevocable forfeiture.198 The
clear distinction between life without parole and other prison sentences favors the
creation of a categorical rule.199 A categorical rule would leave juvenile sentencing
jurisprudence with a clear endpoint and consistent rule courts can apply and
avoid the confusion stemming from a lack of guidance on the manner in which to
apply Miller.200
Ultimately, a categorical rule would provide judges ample discretion to impose
a proper and just sentence on a juvenile offender while ensuring the offender’s
youth and personal background are properly considered as mitigating factors.201
The entire Court agreed that Miller, Jackson, and other youth who commit the
most heinous crimes deserve severe punishment.202 Similar to federal sentencing
procedures, the length of a juvenile homicide offender’s sentence is a decision
best left to the sentencing judge, who will consider the attendant circumstances
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2445, 2469 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 573 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
194

195

Id.; accord Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032–33.

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (emphasis added). It is not clear whether a lengthy term-ofyears sentence with no chance for parole would still provide “a meaningful opportunity for release.”
See Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release Equals Rehabilitation: How the States Must
Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 16 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 1, 10–14 (2011) (arguing
that if states impose a life sentence, they do so with the goal of rehabilitation and provide a truly
meaningful opportunity for release).
196

197

See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2481 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

198

Id. at 2466 (majority opinion).

199

See id.

See id. at 2481 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Leonardo P. Caselli, Case Note, One
Small Step for Juveniles, One Giant Leap for Juvenile Justice; Graham v. Florida, 11 Wyo. L. Rev.
269, 281– 84 (2011) (advocating for the adoption of a categorical ban prohibiting all juvenile life
without parole sentences).
200

201

See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467, 2469 (majority opinion).

See, e.g., id. at 2469 (“That Miller deserved severe punishment for killing Cole Cannon is
beyond question.”).
202
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of the offender’s crime and personal background based on the facts and evidence
presented.203 Furthermore, a categorical rule would not preclude the possibility
that a juvenile homicide offender with insufficient culpability would spend the
remainder of his or her natural life in prison.204 The juvenile offender would still
have to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation to the satisfaction of a parole
board.205 In addition to obtaining release through parole, a juvenile offender could
still gain an opportunity for early release by showing maturity and rehabilitation
to correctional officials, who could award “good time” to the offender.206 The
board may determine a juvenile is indeed irredeemable and deserves incarceration
for the rest of his or her life.207 The determination of irredeemable depravity is
best made by a parole board after a juvenile has been removed from society, not
by a court at the outset.208

Miller’s Impact on Wyoming Law
Like other states, Wyoming will have difficulty determining which juvenile
homicide offenses are “uncommon” as to warrant a life without parole sentence.209
In light of Miller, the Wyoming Legislature should amend its first-degree
murder statute to better reflect the necessary procedures a judge must take while
sentencing a convicted juvenile.210 The legislature may do this in one of two ways,
as demonstrated in recent legislative proposals.211 First, the legislature could add
an additional clause to the murder statute stating that a juvenile may be punished
by life imprisonment without parole only after mitigating factors are considered at

203

See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).

See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469; see also Workman v. Kentucky, 429 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1968) (“However, a different situation prevails when punishment of this stringent a nature
is applied to a juvenile. Juveniles are deprived of many of the benefits of the law of this state, merely
because of their immaturity.”).
204

205

See supra note 37 and accompanying text.

See James B. Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 217, 221
(1982) (defining good time and the methods by which it is awarded to inmates).
206

207

See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467, 2469.

See supra notes 37, 40 and accompanying text. Note that, for example, the factors considered
during sentencing in a federal court do not mandate consideration of the offender’s potential for
or actual rehabilitation; rather, the consideration is for rehabilitative opportunities available to the
offender. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
208

209

See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101 (2007). “Life imprisonment according to law” is a life
sentence that provides the possibility of parole only after the governor has commuted the person’s
sentence to a term of years. See id.; id. § 6-10-301(c) (2010); Weldon v. State, 800 P.2d 513, 514
(Wyo. 1990).
210

See infra notes 212–17 and accompanying text (discussing how adopting factors to be
considered at a special sentencing hearing would meet the United States Supreme Court’s mandate
in Miller).
211
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a separate hearing.212 In delineating the mitigating factors to consider, Wyoming
should adopt a list of specific, but not exclusive, criteria that judges must
consider when sentencing a juvenile offender convicted of first-degree murder.213
Wyoming already has statutory factors for considering whether a juvenile should
be transferred to adult court that would be helpful for judges to consider at a
juvenile’s sentencing.214 These factors include not only a consideration of the
circumstances and nature of the juvenile’s offense, but also factors considering
the juvenile’s maturity, personal background, and potential for rehabilitation.215
The legislative proposal stated that both the defendant and state may provide
evidence of the defendant’s age, maturity, intelligence, relative culpability,
potential for rehabilitation, ability to appreciate risks and consequences, and
any other relevant matter.216 These factors would help Wyoming avoid future
constitutional challenges.217
However, because a trial court under Wyoming law can sentence a juvenile
convicted of homicide to either life without parole or “life according to law,” it
is unclear whether these sentences are the same.218 Under Wyoming law, “life
according to law” requires the Governor commute the offender’s sentence to a
term of years before he or she is eligible for parole.219 If these sentences are in
fact different, then a trial court would not be required to consider the mitigating
factors of youth for a life without parole sentence because such a sentence is not
truly mandatory.220 If the United States Supreme Court adopts a categorical
ban on all life without parole sentences in the future, Wyoming may face a
constitutional challenge as to whether a sentence of “life according to law” would
afford a juvenile offender “a meaningful opportunity to obtain release” under
Graham, especially because executive commutations are rare.221 Currently, the
212

See J. Judiciary Interim Comm., 13LSO-0202.C2, 62d Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2012)

213

See infra notes 214–17 and accompanying text.

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-237 (2004) (discussing relevant statutory factors a judge must
consider before transferring a juvenile to adult court).
214

215

See id.

216

See J. Judiciary Interim Comm., 13LSO-0202.C2, 62d Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2012).

See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s requirement in
Miller for sentencing courts to consider the mitigating qualities of youth and the circumstances of
the offense).
217

218

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101 (2007).

219

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c) (2010).

Compare § 6-2-101 (“life imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment according to
law”), with Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (holding that the mitigating factors of
youth must be considered before sentencing a juvenile to life without parole).
220

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-401(f ). An inmate seeking commutation must first apply to
the Parole Board, which has the power to recommend commutation to the Governor. Id. Then,
the governor decides whether to commute the sentence. Id. In the last three years, the Parole
Board made only 24 recommendations for commutation. Wyo. Bd. of Parole, Annual Report at
3 (2012), available at http://boardofparole.wy.gov/pdf/ AnnualReport.pdf.
221
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Wyoming Supreme Court is considering the issue of whether these two sentences
are the same.222 However, at the time of this writing, the case is pending.223
The second option the Wyoming Legislature is considering is the addition of
a clause to its first degree murder statute requiring juveniles to be sentenced to life
imprisonment, but not life without parole.224 A life imprisonment sentence would
theoretically impose a life sentence and would raise a similar issue of whether
“life imprisonment” and life without parole are identical.225 Under Wyoming law,
a person sentenced to life or life imprisonment is not eligible for parole unless
the Governor has commuted the person’s sentence to a term of years.226 If life
imprisonment is identical to life without parole, the life imprisonment sentence
would not conform to Miller unless the mitigating factors of youth are considered
before imposing such a sentence.227 Interestingly, the proposed statutory language
does not use the words “life according to law.” Rather, it simply states that the
sentence shall be life imprisonment.228 Nevertheless, the structure of a “life
imprisonment” sentence would still raise concerns regarding the would-be former
“life according to law” sentence.229 Therefore, this proposed statute may not
conform to Miller and Graham, given that “life imprisonment” may not provide
juvenile homicide offenders “a meaningful opportunity to gain release.”230 The
Wyoming Legislature’s current proposal would avoid this issue, as the statute
would be revised to permit a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder to become
eligible for parole after serving twenty-five years of his or her life sentence.231
Other state legislatures have acted in response to Miller. At least two state
legislatures have passed statutes that extend Miller’s holding and prohibit life

See Bear Cloud v. State, 275 P.3d 377, 411–13 (Wyo. 2012), vacated, 81 U.S.L.W. 3159
(Oct. 1, 2012).
222

223

Id.

See J. Judiciary Interim Comm., 13LSO-0234.C2, 62d Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2012). The
proposed statutory revision to section 6-2-101 reads, in relevant part: “[A] person convicted of
murder in the first degree who was under the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the offense
shall be punished by life imprisonment.” Id.
224

225

See infra notes 226–31 and accompanying text.

226

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c) (2010).

227

See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).

228

See J. Judiciary Interim Comm., 13LSO-0234.C2, 62d Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2012).

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c) (2010). Any sentence of life or life imprisonment must
be commuted by the governor to a term of years before the offender is eligible for parole. Id.
229

230

See supra notes 77, 122 and accompanying text.

J. Judiciary Interim Comm., 13LSO-0234.C2, 62d Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2012). A juvenile
could still be eligible for parole earlier than twenty-five years if the governor commutes his or her
sentence. Id. See also What a Difference a Day Makes, Casper Star-Tribune, Nov. 8, 2012, http://
trib.com/opinion/what-a-difference-a-day-makes-for-wyoming-lawmakers/article_c35f3773-30fa5198-9ad1-92f832b44167.html.
231
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without parole sentences.232 In Pennsylvania, the state legislature eschewed
juvenile life without parole sentences in favor of a sentence of at least twenty to
thirty-five years in prison.233 In California, the Governor signed into law a bill
allowing juveniles sentenced to life without parole to ask judges to reconsider
their sentences after they serve at least fifteen years in prison.234 A judge may then
reduce the life without parole sentence to twenty-five years to life if the inmate
shows remorse and is taking steps toward rehabilitation.235
Finally, the decision in Miller will require the Wyoming Supreme Court to
revisit Bear Cloud.236 The United States Supreme Court vacated Bear Cloud’s
sentence in light of Miller and remanded his case to the Wyoming Supreme Court.
Presumably, the issue will be whether life without parole and “life according to
law” are the same sentence. If they are the same, then the Wyoming Supreme
Court would be required to remand to the trial court to consider Bear Cloud’s
youth, personal background, and circumstances of his offense before imposing
a life without parole sentence.237 Given Miller’s reasoning, the Court implicitly
rejected the Wyoming Supreme Court’s rationale in Bear Cloud that Bear Cloud’s
sentence was constitutional because the factors in Wyo. Stat. Ann. section 14-6237 were considered during Bear Cloud’s transfer hearing when he sought to be
tried as a juvenile.238

Miller’s Unanswered Questions
Miller’s holding is clear: no mandatory life without parole for juveniles.239
However, the Court did not answer several questions regarding juvenile
sentencing.240 Without a categorical rule, lower courts must now struggle to
232

See infra notes 233–35 and accompanying text.

Pa. House Votes to Alter Juvenile Murder Sentences, Associated Press, Oct. 16, 2012,
http://www.pennlive.com/newsflash/index.ssf/story/pa-house-votes-to-alter-juvenile-murder-sen
tences/9732764717474cde860831d9e5cb0202. The Pennsylvania governor signed this bill into
law on October 26, 2012. Corbett Signs Juvenile Murder Sentence Legislation, Associated Press,
Oct. 26, 2012, http://articles.philly.com/2012-10-26/news/34750494_1_corbett-second-degreeconvictions-legislation. This legislation requires defendants fourteen or younger to serve at least
twenty years for second-degree convictions and twenty-five years for first-degree convictions. Id.
Offenders between fifteen and seventeen would serve at least twenty-five or thirty-five years. Id.
233

234
Don Thompson, Gov. Brown Signs Bill Giving Juveniles Second Chance, Associated Press,
Sept. 30, 2012, http://www.montereyherald.com/national/ci_21667150/gov-brown-signs-billgiving-juveniles-2nd-chance. Miller did not directly affect California sentencing law, as judges have
discretion to impose a sentence between twenty-five years and life. Id.
235

Id.

236

See infra notes 237–38 and accompanying text.

237

See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2474–75 (2012).

238

See id.; Bear Cloud v. State, 275 P.3d 377, 411–13 (Wyo. 2012).

239

See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.

240

See infra notes 242–60 and accompanying text.
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determine the manner in which they must apply Miller’s holding.241 First, some
state appellate courts have narrowly construed Miller but, like the United States
Supreme Court, have provided little guidance for sentencing courts regarding what
mitigating factors of youth must be considered.242 These appellate courts stated
that Miller precluded mandatory life without parole and required consideration
of the mitigating factors of youth.243 However, like the Miller Court, these state
courts did not elaborate as to what must be included in this consideration.244
Next, state courts have struggled with whether Miller applies retroactively
and covers mandatorily imposed life without parole on juveniles sentenced before
Miller.245 A Florida appellate court determined Miller does not warrant retroactive
application to juvenile offenders whose convictions and sentences were final
before the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Miller.246 However,
a dissenting opinion from a recent Indiana Supreme Court decision suggests
that even if a juvenile is not mandatorily sentenced to life without parole, Miller
does not preclude that a discretionarily imposed sentence is unconstitutional.247
Additionally, California courts have reversed cases where the juvenile faced a
presumption of life without parole at sentencing.248 These decisions are but the
first examples of states struggling to determine whether to apply Miller to those
juveniles already serving life without parole sentences. The United States Supreme
Court has stated, in Teague v. Lane, that new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure would not be applicable to those cases which have become final before
the new rules are announced.249 However, later that year the Court clarified that
there were two primary exceptions to the ruling in Teague, which would not apply
if the rule prohibited a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants

241

See infra notes 242–60 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 2012 WL 3802280, at *15 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2012) (“[The
Court] emphasized Graham’s ‘categorical bar’ to life without parole sentences applied ‘only to nonhomicide offenses.’”); State v. Lockheart, 2012 WL 2814378, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. July 11,
2012) (“[T]he sentencing court shall ‘have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances
before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.’”).
242

243

See supra note 242 and accompanying text.

244

See supra note 242 and accompanying text.

245

See infra notes 246–48 and accompanying text.

See Geter v. State, No. 3D12-1736, 2012 WL 4448860, at *10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept.
27, 2012) (“Miller does not warrant retroactive application to Florida juvenile offenders whose
convictions and sentences were final as of . . . the date Miller was issued.”).
246

247
See Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 885 (Ind. 2012) (Rucker, J., dissenting) (stating that
the differences between youth and adults that preclude mandatory life without parole for juveniles
may also lead to the conclusion that life without parole for a particular youth is unconstitutional).
248
See People v. Moffett, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 47, 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); see also People v.
Hoffman, 2012 WL 3066392 (Cal. Ct. App. July 30, 2012).
249

489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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because of their status or offense.250 In addition, states theoretically could employ
a less restrictive view of applying Teague in cases on collateral review.251 State
courts will likely continue to struggle with whether Miller should be applied
retroactively.252 In at least one state, the other branches of government have
chosen to determine what Miller’s effect should be on offenders already serving
life without parole for crimes committed while they were juveniles.253
In addition, Miller did not clarify whether a juvenile homicide offender
must be given a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation.254 When announcing its holding in Miller, the Court
referred to Graham’s “meaningful opportunity” requirement but did not address
whether juvenile homicide offenders must receive that same opportunity.255 To
date, no court has considered whether the state must give a juvenile homicide
offender a meaningful opportunity for release—an issue that likely would
require consideration of establishing a categorical rule against all life without
parole sentences.256
Furthermore, the Court did not address whether a lengthy term of years
sentence for juvenile offenders would violate the Eighth Amendment as cruel and
unusual.257 At least one federal circuit court of appeals and one state appellate court
have concluded that lengthy term of years sentences do not violate either Miller or
Graham.258 However, an appellate court in California concluded that a 110 year

See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320–21 (2002).
250

251
Mary C. Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane on State Post
conviction Remedies, 44 Ala. L. Rev. 421, 449–58 (1993) (describing various, less restrictive
standards states could apply on collateral postconviction reviews).

See Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions,
26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 811, 874 (2003); Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence
333 (1990) (stating that the avoidance of retroactivity is just one other consideration to weigh in the
social balance).
252

253
See supra note 234 and accompanying text (describing how California’s Governor signed
a bill allowing a juvenile already serving life without parole to petition a judge to review his or her
sentence after serving fifteen years).
254
Compare supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing Graham’s requirement of a
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release”), with supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing
Miller’s holding).
255

See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467–69 (2012).

256

See id.

257

See infra notes 258–60 and accompanying text.

See Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 552–53 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that an eighty-nine
year sentence imposed on a juvenile with no possibility of parole was constitutionally permissible
under Graham); Walle v. State, No. 2D11-1393, 2012 WL 4465555, at *6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept.
28, 2012) (dismissing defendant’s argument that ninety-two year prison sentence was functional
equivalent of life without the possibility of release, thus violating Graham).
258
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to life sentence imposed against a juvenile non-homicide offender violated the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.259 It is
important to note these cases all dealt with juveniles convicted of non-homicide
offenses. No case has yet considered whether a lengthy term of years sentence with
no possibility of parole imposed on a juvenile homicide offender would violate
the Eighth Amendment. When a court considers this question, it will find little
guidance from Miller.260

Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court correctly held that the mandatory
imposition of juvenile life without parole sentences is unconstitutional under
the Eighth Amendment.261 However, the Court should have engaged in its
proportionality analysis as it did in Roper and Graham to prohibit all juvenile
life without parole sentences.262 A categorical prohibition would establish a
bright-line rule that simply mandates the State to provide a juvenile offender
with “a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity
and rehabilitation.”263 This rule would help eliminate both the confusion and
uncertainty sentencing judges will face while providing clearer guidance for lower
courts to follow.264
Further, Wyoming should consider one of two proposed bills that would
either invalidate life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders or require
a separate hearing to consider various factors.265 Without one of these revisions,
Wyoming judges will have to sentence juveniles with very little guidance from
Miller.266 A categorical rule against juvenile life without parole sentences would
remove this uncertainty and ensure juveniles receive a meaningful opportunity to
obtain release based on maturity and demonstrated rehabilitation.267 Time, along
with maturity into adulthood and rehabilitation, will ease the juvenile homicide
offender’s immaturity to where he or she could successfully reenter society.268
259
See People v. Caballero, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 286, 294–96 (Cal. 2012) (holding that 110 year
sentence before possibility of parole would not meet Graham’s requirement providing the offender
with an opportunity to demonstrate growth and maturity to try to secure his release). In Caballero,
the offender was convicted of multiple counts of attempted murder. Id. at 288.

Cf. Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (“Without any tools
to work with, however, we can only apply Graham as it is written. If the Supreme Court has more
in mind, it will have to say what that is.”).
260

261

See supra notes 122 –45 and accompanying text.

262

See supra notes 173–208 and accompanying text.

263

See supra notes 200–08 and accompanying text.

264

See supra notes 242–48 and accompanying text.

265

See supra notes 210–31 and accompanying text.

266

See supra notes 209–31 and accompanying text.

267

See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).

268

See Sophocles, supra note 1; see also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
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